On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods by Cox, James & Sadiraj, Vjollca
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
10-4-2006 
On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods 
James Cox 
Georgia State University 
Vjollca Sadiraj 
Georgia State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Cox, James and Sadiraj, Vjollca, "On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods" (2006). ExCEN 
Working Papers. 149. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/149 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
By James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj*
October 4, 2006
Abstract
This paper addresses four stylized facts that summarize data from experimental studies
of voluntary contributions to provision of public goods. Theoretical propositions and testable
hypotheses for voluntary contributions are derived from two models of social preferences, the
inequity aversion model and the egocentric other-regarding preferences model. We nd that
the egocentric other-regarding preferences model with classical regularity properties can better
account for the stylized facts than the inequity aversion model with non-classical properties.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Americans gave more than $240 billion to charities in 2003 (Giving USA 2004 ). Much of this
charity is distributed as private goods to recipients who are anonymous to the contributors, and
hence it is only the total amounts of categories of contributions that can generate utility to the
contributors. But the same total amount can be contributed if you give more and I give less. In
that way, charitable contributions are public goods.
Fundamental questions in public economics center on understanding the conditions under which
public goods can be supplied through voluntary contributions if perhaps not optimally then at
least at signicantly positive levels. Development of this understanding requires both empirical and
theoretical research.
Experiments with human subjects in simple laboratory environments provide one type of data
that can guide theoretical modeling. A large literature reports the ways in which voluntary contri-
butions to public goods vary with the treatment parameters that dene the simplied experimental
public economy. Some stylized facts about the properties of voluntary provision of public goods
have emerged from these experiments. Theoretical modeling seeks to explain these stylized facts
(and other relevant data).
It has long been accepted that traditional microeconomic and game theoretic models of self-
regarding (or "economic man") preferences cannot rationalize data from public goods experiments
(Ledyard 1995). We ask whether two recent models of social preferences can rationalize the data.
We examine a model of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and a model of egocentric
other-regarding preferences (Cox and Sadiraj 2003).
Both of these models incorporate other-regarding preferences: if you and I participate in a
voluntary contributions game then my utility varies with your material payo¤ as well as my own
and your utility also varies with both my payo¤ and yours. In this way, both models generalize
3
traditional economic man preferences to incorporate what were traditionally called "consumption
externalities." But the two models of social preferences we consider have di¤erent relationships
to two properties of classical preference theory (Hicks 1939, Samuelson 1947), strict convexity
and strict positive monotonicity. Strict convexity is the traditional assumption that indi¤erence
curves (or surfaces, for more than two variables) are strictly convex to the origin. Strict positive
monotonicity is the traditional assumption that more is preferred to less. If social preferences
are strictly monotonic then others payo¤s as well as ones own payo¤ are always goods. The
egocentric other-regarding preferences model incorporates both strict convexity and strict positive
monotonicity. In contrast, the inequity aversion model has preferences that are not positively
monotonic and not strictly convex (because the indi¤erence "curves" are piecewise linear). The
inequity aversion models inconsistency with positive monotonicity is fundamental: your material
payo¤ is a good to me when it is less than my payo¤ but a bad when it is larger than my payo¤.
We use the egocentric other-regarding preferences model and inequity aversion model to address
the question of rationalizing data with the patterns in four stylized facts from linear public good
experiments. We nd that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model with classical regularity
properties can better account for the stylized facts than the inequity aversion model with non-
classical properties.
2 STYLIZED FACTS
Some of the data patterns that characterize voluntary contributions in experiments with linear
public good games are described in the following stylized facts.
1. Contributions: Average contributions to a public good are a signicant fraction of total en-
dowment. About half of all individual contribution decisions involve dividing the individuals
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endowment between contributions to the public good and private consumption (Holt and
Laury in press). Positive contributions are markedly heterogenous across individuals even in
the last round of multi-round experiments (Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984; Andreoni 1988,
1995a; Isaac, Walker, and Williams 1994; Laury and Petrie 2005)
2. Marginal per capita return (MPCR): This is an individuals rate of change in self-
regarding utility from making a marginal transfer of the endowed resource from his private
consumption to production of the public good.1 Higher MPCRs have been found to elicit
larger contributions (Marwell and Ames 1979; Isaac, Walker and Thomas 1984; Kim and
Walker 1984; Isaac and Walker 1988; Saijo and Nakamura 1992).
3. Group size: For low to moderate group sizes and low values of MPCR, larger group sizes
are associated with larger contributions (Isaac and Walker 1988; Isaac, Walker and Williams
1990).
4. Endowment e¤ects in homogeneous environments: Environment homogeneity means
that all subjects are given the same endowment and that the marginal monetary payo¤s are
the same for everybody. With environment homogeneity, larger endowments have been found
to elicit larger contributions in both one-shot treatments (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005)
and in the last round of multi-round treatments (Andreoni 1988, 1995a).
3 PREVIOUS CONLUSIONS ABOUT THEORY
Ledyard (1995) concludes that (a) "hard-nosed" game theory cannot explain the data2 and (b)
altruism cannot explain the data. In contrast, altruistic models of public good games are reported
to be empirically supported by Andreoni (1995a), Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998), and Goeree,
Holt and Laury (2002).
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Studies that employ altruistic models to try to explain behavior in public good games are
abundant in the literature. Andreoni (1989) introduces the "warm-glow" model of altruism.3 But
Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) nd only limited empirical support for the warm-glow model.
Levine (1998) develops a linear model of altruism that is consistent with some of the stylized
facts in Ledyards (1995) survey. But Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) report that linear altruism
cannot rationalize their data. Levine acknowledges the di¢ culty his linear model has in capturing
individual contributions that are neither 0 nor the potential maximum and concludes that Andreoni
and Millers (2002) nonlinear model of altruism may better explain such contributions. However,
Andreoni and Millers discussion of public good games doesnt go further than being suggestive.
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) implement an experimental design with constant marginal value
of the public good and randomly-varying, individual-specic values of the private good intended
to identify subjectsresponse functions. They reject altruism that is (assumed to be) linear and
homogeneous across subjects in favor of a warm glow explanation that is allowed to vary across
subjects.
Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) address the altruism vs. noise question with an experimental
design that separately varies the "internal" return (of a subjects own monetary payo¤) and the
"external" return (of other subjectspayo¤s) from a change in contributions to the public good.
They report that contributions increase with internal return, external return, and group size. Their
data support the conclusion that individual choices are motivated by altruistic other-regarding pref-
erences that respond to the external return and group size rather than warm-glow altruism. They
nd di¤erences in individual altruism coe¢ cients, that is heterogeneous other-regarding preferences.
They also report that a linear model of altruistic other-regarding preferences does not rationalize
the data as well as a Cobb-Douglas (nonlinear) other-regarding preferences model. One of the two
models discussed in the following section, the egocentric other-regarding preferences model, is a
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constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference model that contains Cobb-Douglas preferences
as a special case.
4 MODELS OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES
In this paper, we consider two models of other-regarding preferences, the egocentric altruism model
(Cox and Sadiraj 2003) which includes preferences that are altruistic, albeit egocentric, and the
inequity aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) which includes preferences that are inequality
averse. Both models include preferences that are heterogeneous across subjects. The egocentric
other-regarding preferences model maintains the classical preference properties of strict convexity
and strict positive monotonicity ("more is always preferred to less") while the inequity aversion
model maintains neither of these properties. The inequity aversion model has piecewise linear
indi¤erence surfaces that are inconsistent with strict convexity. This models inconsistency with
positive monotonicity is fundamental: another persons money payo¤ is a good if it is less than
ones own but a bad if it is greater than ones own.
We derive theoretical predictions of these two models for linear public good games and analyze
their ability to replicate the stylized facts. The stylized facts are based on contributions in the
last round of multi-round experiments. This should provide data that are free from strategic
motivations.
In a voluntary contributions, linear public good game, n  2 players simultaneously choose the
amounts they will contribute to a public good. Typically, each subject is given an endowment w
and asked to choose an amount gi 2 [0; w] to invest in the public good. Investments in the public
good yield the constant rate of return a 2 [1=n; 1); whereas the rate of return on investments in the
private good equals 1. Thus the monetary payo¤ yi to subject i from participating in one period
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of a voluntary contributions public good experiment is
yi = w   gi + a
nX
j=1
gj : (1)
4.1 The inequity aversion model
The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is based on the assumption that agent i has preferences over
her own payo¤ yi and n  1 otherspayo¤s yj , j 6= i; in which anothers payo¤ is a good when it is
less than ones own payo¤ and a bad when it is larger than ones own payo¤. For the special case
n = 2; the utility function for agent 1 can be written as
u1(y1; y2) = (1 + 1)y1   1y2; if y1 < y2 (2)
= (1  1)y1 + 1y2; if y1  y2
where 1  1 and 0  1  1: Figure 1 shows typical indi¤erence "curves" for utility function
(2). The dening property of inequality (or "inequity") aversion is shown by the positive slopes
of the indi¤erence curves above the forty-ve degree line.
In general, inequity averse preferences can be represented by the family of utility functions:
ui(y) = yi   i
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
max(yj   yi; 0)  i
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
max(yi   yj ; 0)
where i  i and 0  i < 1. This model has the following implications for the nal period of a
voluntary contributions public good game. Let G  g1+ g2+ : : :+ gn denote the total contribution
to the public good. Then the utility ui(y(gi; g i))(  i(g)) that agent i derives from a contribution
prole g = (gi; g i) is
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 i(g) = w   gi + aG  i
1
n  1
X
j:gi>gj
(gi   gj)  i
1
n  1
X
j:gi<gj
(gj   gi) : (3)
The following proposition is proved in appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 If n  3 or n > 3 and i  n 1n 3(1  a) for all i; then:
1. there are no asymmetric equilibria;
2. the vector of zero contributions, (0; :::; 0) is a Nash equilibrium, and
(a) if i < 1  a for some i 2 f1; :::; ng then there no other equilibria,
(b) if i  1  a for all i 2 f1; :::; ng; then any vector of contributions (z; :::; z), z 2 [0; w] is
a Nash equilibrium.
The intuition for this proposition goes as follows. For any given asymmetric vector of con-
tributions, an individual with maximum contribution g is better o¤ by deviating down, i.e. by
contributing  less that the maximum, g   , yet not less than the second highest contribution.
By doing so he increases his own private payo¤ by (1  a) and reduces the di¤erence between his
payo¤ (when g is contributed) and the payo¤s of the other k i individuals with lower contributions
by in 1k
 
i ; although he increases the di¤erence between his payo¤ (when g is contributed) and
the payo¤s of the other k+i individuals with contributions of g by
i
n 1k
+
i . Since the total gain,
(1   a) + in 1k
 
i is not smaller than

(1  a) + in 1

 whereas the loss in 1k
+
i is not bigger
than4 in 1(n   3); then by the assumption that i 
n 1
n 3(1   a); individual i is better o¤. Since
the assumption holds for all individuals, there is no individual who wants to be among the highest
contributors and therefore there are no asymmetric equilibria.
Figure 1 illustrates why there can be no asymmetric equilibria for the two-agent special case.
Let individual 1 invest more than individual 2 and the nal payo¤ be A = (y1; y

2);where y

2 > y

1:
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As it can be seen from Figure 1, a smaller contribution of individual 1 that results in money
allocations from the triangle with corners A = (y1; y

2); L = (y

1; y

1) and H = (y

2; y

2), put him
on a higher indi¤erence curve. Thus we are left with only symmetric equilibria. For any vector
of symmetric contributions L, deviating up and o¤ering more is never desirable according to this
model since that would decrease the individuals own payo¤and increase the unfavorable di¤erences
in payo¤s with all other individuals. Figure 1 illustrates this case for a two-player game. A larger
contribution by player 1 decreases his own payo¤ and increases the others payo¤, resulting in a
nal money allocation on the left and above point L = (y2; y

2), which is on a lower indi¤erence
curve. In particular, this implies that the vector of zero contributions is a Nash equilibrium since
the only possible deviations are contributing more. For any other symmetric vector of positive
contributions, it pays to deviate down for an individual if and only if the gain in individual payo¤,
(1   a) is bigger than the loss from increased di¤erences in payo¤s by in 1(n   1), i.e. if and
only if i < (1   a). Again referring to Figure 1, if the smaller contribution g    results in a
nal allocation (w   g + + 2ag   a; w   g + + 2ag   a) above the line through L (which
is true if m < (1   a)) then individual 1 would prefer it to g since that puts her on a higher
indi¤erence curve. Hence, if there is at least one such individual then she wants to deviate down
and, furthermore, since no one wants to be the highest contributor the only Nash equilibrium is
the vector of zero contributions.
The models implications for behavioral patterns represented in the stylized facts are as
follows.
Contributions implication. The experimental treatments reported in Table 1 have parame-
ters that satisfy 1  n 1n 3(1   a). The inequity aversion model species that i  1; for all i:
Therefore the assumption in Proposition 1, i  n 1n 3(1 a); for all i; is satised for the experimen-
tal treatments reported in Table 1. Furthermore, 1  a  0:5 in all reported experiments. Hence if
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we reasonably assume that there is at least one individual with i < 0:5 then the inequity aversion
model predicts contributions of 0 as a unique Nash equilibrium.5 The data tell a di¤erent story.
In the Table 1 treatments with n = 4 from Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984, Isaac, Walker,
and Williams 1994, and Laury and Petrie 2005, together with the n = 5 treatments from Andreoni
1988, 1995a, seventy-two of 164 (or forty-four percent) of the subjects make positive contributions
to the public good in the last round. Figure 2 shows the distribution of positive contributions in
these experiments. On average, the last round contributions by positive contributors is forty-three
percent of their endowments.6 Furthermore, positive contributors are notably heterogenous; the
range of positive contributions is from two percent to 100 percent of endowments.
Figures reported in the right-most column of Table 1 show percentages of subjects who make
positive contributions in the last round in several experiments. Positive contributions in the last
round, by eleven percent to fty-seven percent of the subjects, cannot be explained by the inequity
aversion model. We conclude that the inequity aversion model cannot account for stylized fact 1
about contributions.
MPCR implication. Proposition 1 implies that, for any given n, the value of MPCR (which is
a) should have no e¤ect on contributions as long as there is at least one individual with i < 1  a
and a 2 ( 1n ;
2
n 1 ].
7 Yet the empirical evidence is di¤erent. As an example, take studies with
n = 4 reported in Table 1. Three studies with a = 0:5 report percentages of positive contributors
varying from twenty-seven percent to fourty-four percent whereas two studies with a = 0:3 report
percentages varying from twenty-ve percent to thirty-one percent. Note that in case of n = 4;
the range of a for which no e¤ect is predicted is a 2 (0:25; 0:67]; and since the above a values of
0:3 and 0:5 are within that range, the inequity aversion model cannot account for the change in
contributions with MPCR when n = 4. A similar result holds for n = 5 data. We conclude that
the inequity aversion model cannot account for stylized fact 2 about MPCR.
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Group Size implication. Now with respect to the group size, Proposition 1 says that for
any given a there should be no e¤ect if n  1 + 2=a; provided there is at least one individual with
i < 1   a.8 Consider the studies with a = 0:5 and n = 4 or n = 5 reported in Table 1. The
percentage of positive contributors varies from forty-four percent to fty-seven percent for studies
with n = 5 whereas for the studies with n = 4 it varies from twenty-seven percent to forty-four
percent. Since both n = 4 and n = 5 are not larger than 1 + 2=0:5(= 5); the inequity aversion
model cannot explain the observed shift in the distribution of percentage of positive contributors,
hence cannot account for stylized fact 3 about group size.
Endowment implication. The "if condition" in Proposition 1 is satised in the Andreoni
1988, 1995a experiments and therefore this proposition applies to data from the experiments. We
use round ten data from the "strangers" treatment in Andreoni 1988 and the "regular" treatment in
Andreoni 1995a. The only di¤erence between these treatments is that the strangers treatment uses
the homogeneous endowment of fty while the regular treatment uses the homogeneous endowment
of sixty. Empirical cumulative distributions for data from the two treatments are shown in Figure
4. The inequity aversion model predicts that all contributions equal zero, independently of the
endowment, hence that there will be no endowment e¤ect on the level of contributions. The
average of the positive contributions is twenty when the endowment is fty and twenty-nine when
the endowment is sixty. These means are signicantly di¤erent, with one-sided p-value of 0.06. The
Epps-Singleton test on the empirical cumulative distributions detects a signicant di¤erence with
p-value of 0.06. We conclude that the inequity aversion model cannot account for stylized fact 4
about endowments.
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4.2 The egocentric other-regarding preferences model
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model (Cox and Sadiraj 2003) is similar to the Andreoni
and Miller (2002) model in that it represents altruistic preferences in which ones own as well
as others payo¤s are goods (for which more is preferred to less). In addition, this model can
incorporate reciprocity naturally by allowing the altruism coe¢ cient to depend on another persons
prior behavior (or revealed intentions), as in the two-player version of the model in Cox, Friedman
and Gjerstad (in press).
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model is based on the assumption that agent i has
preferences over her own payo¤ yi and n   1 otherspayo¤s yj , j 6= i; that can be represented
by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions. For the special case n = 2; other-
regarding preference parameter 1, and elasticity coe¢ cient 1 strictly between 0 and 1, the utility
function for agent 1 can be written as
u1(y1; y2) = y
1
1 + 1y
1
2 (4)
Figure 3 shows typical indi¤erence curves for utility function (4). The indi¤erence curves are strictly
convex to the origin and (everywhere) have negative slopes. The egocentricity property means that
for any positive values of y1 and y2; such that y1 = y2; and any positive value of , individual 1
prefers the outcome in which he gets y1 +  and individual 2 gets y2    to the outcome in which
he gets y1    and the other gets y2 + : Egocentricity implies that  < 1, hence that the slopes of
indi¤erence curves are less than  1 where they cross the 45-degree line.
In general, egocentric other-regarding preferences can be represented by the family of utility
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functions:
ui(y) =
1
i
0@yii + iX
j 6=i
yij
1A ; if i 6= 0 (5)
= yi
Y
j 6=i
yij ; if i = 0:
In the special case in which  = 0, the CES preferences are Cobb-Douglas, as shown on the second
line of statement (5).9 Given that i > 0, utility function ui(y) has the classical regularity properties
of strict convexity and strict positive monotonicity for all (positive, zero, and negative) values of
the convexity parameter i such that i < 1. In summary, egocentrity, strict positive monotonicity,
and strict convexity imply the parameter restrictions i < 1 and 0 < i < 1; for all i:
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model has the following implications for the nal
period of a voluntary contributions public good game. (A proof is in appendix A.2.)
Proposition 2 The egocentric other-regarding preferences model predicts outcomes for a linear
public good experiment that depend on the rate of return a; the size of the group n and the individual
preference parameters r and r; as follows.
1. If r  1=a 1n 1 for all individuals r then there are no asymmetric equilibria. In addition if the
assumption is satised with strict inequality for at least one individual then the unique Nash
equilibrium is for all contributions to equal 0.
2. If r  1=a 1n 1 for all individuals r then there are no asymmetric equilibria. Furthermore if
the condition is satised with strict inequality for at least one individual then the unique Nash
equilibrium is for all contributions to equal w.
3. If neither the condition in part 1 nor the condition in part 2 is true then there are no sym-
metric equilibria. In any asymmetric equilibrium, individuals with i >
1=a 1
n 1 make positive
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contributions whereas the ones with
 
1
a + 1
1 j j < 1=a 1n 1 contribute 0:
Proposition 2 has the following implications for the data patterns described in the stylized facts.
Contributions implication. In all of the studies reported in Table 1, 1=a 1n 1 takes values
from 0:25 to 0:78: Since i 2 (0; 1); conditions in parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 are not likely
to be met. Indeed, none of the experiments reported in Table 1 include observations where all
subjects contributed either 0 or w: This reveals that part 3 of the proposition is relevant. According
to part 3, an individuals optimal contribution will be positive or zero, depending on the ratio
(1=a  1)=(n  1) as well as the individuals other-regarding preference parameters i and i: The
group of experiments reported in Table 1 shows substantial numbers of individuals making both
positive and zero contributions, which is consistent with part 3 of the proposition. We conclude that
the egocentric other-regarding preferences model can account for stylized fact 1 about contributions.
MPCR implication. Everything else equal, if a increases then 1=a 1n 1 decreases, and therefore
the fraction of individuals with i >
1=a 1
n 1 increases. Part 3 of Proposition 2 implies that there will
be more individuals with positive contributions as a increases. Furthermore, for any given j < 1;
if a increases then 1=a 1n 1
 
1
a + 1
j 1 decreases. Part 3 of the proposition then implies that there
will be fewer individuals with (1=a+ 1)1 j j < (1=a  1)=(n  1) who are predicted to contribute
nothing to the public good. Hence both e¤ects imply that the number of free riders is expected
to decrease. This is consistent with the observed e¤ect of increasing a on the share of positive
contributions reported in Table 1. The percentage of positive contributions for groups of size ve
increases from eleven percent in the study with a = 0:33 (row 10 in Table 1) to the average of
fty-two percent in studies with a = 0:5 (rows 1-3 in Table 1). Looking at the studies with group
size four, we nd a similar e¤ect of increasing a on the percentage of positive contributors, the
average increases from twenty-eight to thirty-ve. We conclude that the egocentric other-regarding
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preferences model can account for stylized fact 2 about MPCR.
Group Size implication. Everything else equal, if n increases then (1=a 1)=(n 1) decreases,
and therefore the fraction of individuals with i > (1=a  1)=(n  1) may increase. If that happens
then part 3 of Proposition 2 implies that there will be more individuals with positive contributions.
The same part of the proposition implies that there will be fewer individuals with (1=a+ 1)1 j j <
(1=a  1)=(n  1) who are predicted to contribute nothing to the public good. Thus the expected
total e¤ect of a larger n is a higher percentage of positive contributions. In the studies with
a = 0:5 reported in Table 1, the percentage of positive contributions varies from forty-four percent
to fty-seven percent for studies with n = 5 whereas for the ones with n = 4 it varies from
twenty-seven percent to forty-four percent. This is consistent with the egocentric other-regarding
preferences models predictions. We conclude that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model
can account for stylized fact 3 about group size.
Endowment implication. Utility functions in statement (5) for the egocentric other-regarding
preferences model are homogenous in payo¤s. Payo¤ functions in equation (1) for linear public good
games are linear. With endowments that are the same for all subjects, the composition of a utility
function and payo¤ functions is homogenous in the common endowment w. As shown in appendix
A.3, this homogeneity property implies that the equilibrium contribution proportions gi(w)=w at
endowment w are the same as the equilibrium contribution proportions gi(!)=! at endowment ! for
all positive w and !:This in turn immediately implies that gi(!) > gi(w) for all ! > w:We use round
ten data from the strangers treatment in Andreoni 1988 and the regular treatment in Andreoni
1995a, shown in Figure 4 to test two hypotheses. The Epps-Singleton test of the hypothesis that the
proportional amounts sent at endowment levels of fty and sixty are equal (gi(50)=50 = gi(60)=60)
is not rejected at conventional signicance levels (p-value = 0.15). We conclude that the egocentric
other-regarding preferences model can account for stylized fact 4 about endowments.
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Traditional microeconomic and game-theoretic models of self-regarding (or "economic man") pref-
erences imply zero contributions by all subjects in the last round of nitely-repeated voluntary
contributions games. This is not observed, hence new theory is needed. We discuss the impli-
cations of two recent models of social preferences for voluntary contributions to a public good.
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model incorporates the classical preference properties
of strict convexity and strict positive monotonicity. The inequity aversion model has neither of
these regularity properties. The egocentric other-regarding preferences model is more successful in
rationalizing data from public goods experiments than is the inequity aversion model.
The inequity aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) predicts contributions of 0 as a unique
Nash equilibrium for voluntary contributions in ordinary, one-stage public good experiments. In a
large number of many-period experiments that we survey (see Table 1), nal period contributions
are positive for about thirty-eight percent of the subjects. Furthermore, the inequity aversion model
has the same implications for these public good experiments as does the traditional self-regarding
(or "economic man") model. We conclude that neither the economic man model nor the inequity
aversion model can explain behavior in ordinary public goods experiments that is characterized by
a high proportion of hetergenously-positive individual contributions.10 Furthermore, the inequity
aversion model cannot account for the other three stylized facts for data from linear public good
experiments.
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model has both symmetric and asymmetric Nash
equilibria. The asymmetric equilibria are consistent with typical data from linear public good
experiments in which many subjects contribute zero and many make positive contributions that
are less than their endowments. This model can account for the four stylized facts from linear
public good experiments.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part 1. Consider any vector g with non-identical contributions. Let agent i be one of
the individuals with the largest contribution in g. That is, there are no contributions larger than
gi. Since the contributions are not identical, there exists at least one individual j with a smaller
contribution than gi. These statements imply that agent is utility is
 i(gi; g i) = w   gi + aG  i
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
(gi   gj):
Suppose that agent i deviates and o¤ers slightly less than gi , say he o¤ers gi    where  is such
that gi    is strictly greater than the second highest contribution in g.11 In this case, let k i (
 1) be the number of smaller contributors, and k+i the number of individuals in the group whose
contribution is gi. Note that k i  1 and therefore () 0  k
+
i  n   2. The utility of agent i in
this case is
 i(gi   ; g i) = w   (gi   ) + a(G  )  i
1
n  1
X
j:gi >gj
(gi      gj)  i
k+i
n  1
Straightforwardly, the di¤erence in utilities is
 i(gi   ; g i)   i(gi; g i) = (1  a+ i
k i
n  1   i
k+i
n  1)
which is positive if (1  a) (n 1) > ik+i  ik
 
i : Inequalities () and i  i imply ik
+
i  ik
 
i 
i(n   2)   i < i(n   3): Hence a su¢ cient condition for agent i to be better o¤ in case of
contributing gi    is i < (1  a) (n  1)=(n  3) which is true by assumption.
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It can be straightforwardly shown that similar result holds for n  3
Part 2. To start with, note that the vector of zero contributions, (0; :::; 0) is a Nash Equilibrium.
Indeed, in this case the utility of any agent is simply ! and any unilateral deviation from it,
necessarily involving a strictly positive contribution, say gi = " > 0 results in  i(gi; 0) = w   " +
a" i" which is smaller than w: Now let g be a vector of identical positive contributions, gj = z > 0
for all j = 1:::n: The utility of some agent i is  i(z; z) = w+ (na  1)z whereas in case of investing
less than z; say z ", " 2 (0; z]; agent is utility becomes  i(z "; z) = w z+"+a(nz ") i" =
Ui(z; z) + "(1   a   i): This implies that if there is an agent with i < 1   a then he is better
o¤ by contributing less than z and therefore g = (z; z; :::; z) is not a Nash equilibrium, so part 2.a
is shown. On the other hand if i  1   a; for all i then the last equality implies that nobody is
better o¤ by deviating down. Similarly, as for the vector of zero contributions, (0; :::; 0) it can be
shown that deviating up cannot increase utility. This concludes the proof for part 2.b.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let each agent be endowed with amount w of the private good that can be consumed or contributed
as input in amount gj ; j = 1; 2; :::; n; to production of the public good. Let G  g1 + g2 + : : :+ gn
denote the total contribution to the public good. Then the utility, i(g) of contribution prole
g = (gi; g i) to agent i is
i(g) =
1
i
0@(w   gi + aG)i + iX
j 6=i
(w   gj + aG)i
1A ; if i 6= 0 (6)
= (w   gi + aG)
Y
j 6=i
(w   gj + aG)i ; if i = 0
Utility function (6) is used to prove the following proposition.
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Proof. Let g = (g1; : : : ; gn) be a vector of contributions to the public good. Consider some agent
r. Di¤erentiating the utility function (6) of agent r if  6= 0; with respect to her own contribution
gr; one nds that the partial derivative is (a   1)yr 1r + ar
P
j 6=r y
r 1
j where yk = (w   gk +
aG)k 1; k 2 fj; rg: The sign of the partial derivative then is determined by
F (gr; g r)   1 +
a
1  ar
X
j 6=r
(
yr
yj
)1  (7)
If  = 0 for agent r; the sign of the agents marginal utility is given by substituting  = 0 in
(7).
Part 1: r  1=a 1n 1 ; for all r = 1; :::; n: We show rst that there are no asymmetric equilibria,
and then we show that if the inequality is strict for at least one agent then g = (0; 0; : : : ; 0) is the
unique Nash equilibrium.
Let a vector of contributions g be given. Suppose that g is an asymmetric vector. Let some
player i be one of the highest contributors. Hence yiyj  1, 8j 6= i and
yi
yj
< 1, for at least one j 6= i
which is true by asymmetry of g: This and the assumption that i  1=a 1n 1 imply that the sign of
(7) at (gi; g i) is negative since F (gi; g i) < (n  1)ia=(1  a)  1  0: Therefore g cannot be an
equilibrium.
Suppose that g is symmetric. Then for any given r one has yryj = 1, 8j 6= r: Let i be an agent
for whom i <
1=a 1
n 1 . Then for that agent i one has F (gi; g i) = (n   1)ia=(1   a)   1 < 0; and
therefore g cannot be in equilibrium unless g = (0; 0; : : : ; 0):
Part 2: r  1=a 1n 1 ; for all r = 1; :::; n: We show rst that there are no asymmetric equilibria,
and then we show that if the inequality is strict for at least one agent then g = (w;w; : : : ; w) is the
unique Nash equilibrium.
Let a vector of contributions g be given. Suppose that g is an asymmetric vector. Let some
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player i be one of the lowest contributors. Hence yiyj  1, 8j 6= i and
yi
yj
> 1, for at least one j 6= i
which is true by asymmetry of g: This and the assumption that i  1=a 1n 1 imply that the sign
of (7) at (gi; g i) is positive since F (gi; g i) > (n   1)ia=(1   a)   1  0: Hence g cannot be an
equilibrium.
Suppose that g is symmetric. Then for any given r one has yryj = 1, 8j 6= r: Let i be an agent
for whom i >
1=a 1
n 1 : Then for that agent i one has F (gi; g i) = (n   1)ia=(1   a)   1 > 0; and
therefore g cannot be an equilibrium unless g = (w;w; : : : ; w):
Part 3. By assumption the subsets of players I = fi j i > 1=a 1n 1 g and J = fjj j <
1=a 1
n 1 g
are not empty. Then there are no symmetric equilibria. Indeed, for any symmetric vector of
contributions individuals from I are better o¤ by deviating up, as part 2, shows whereas individuals
from J are better o¤ by deviating down, as part 1 shows. That individuals with i >
1=a 1
n 1 make
positive contributions follows from part 2 where it is shown that such individuals cannot be among
minimal contributors. Since the minimum contribution is nonnegative, the contribution of such
individuals must be positive. Furthermore, in any asymmetric equilibrium g; individuals with
parameters such that
 
1
a + 1
1 j j < 1=a 1n 1 will make zero contributions since for any positive
contribution gj one has F (gj ; g j) < 0; which follows from
F (gj ; g j) =
a
1  aj
X
r 6=j
(
yj
yr
)1 j   1
=
a
1  aj
X
r 6=j
(
w   gj + aG
w   gr + aG
)1 j   1
 a
1  aj
X
r 6=j
(1 +
1
a
)1 j   1
=
a
1  aj(n  1)(1 +
1
a
)1 j   1:
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A.3 Proof of the Endowment E¤ect
Proof. Let the initial endowment w be the same for all agents. We show that the amount of the
initial endowment:
1. has no e¤ect on individual contributions as a percentage of the endowment;
2. has a positive e¤ect on the absolute contributions of individuals.
First note that
i(w; g) = w
ii(1; ) (8)
where  = g=w and i = i if i 6= 0 and i = 1 + (n  1)i if i = 0:
Indeed, denoting G =
P
r=1::n gr one has
- if i 6= 0 then
i(w; g) =
w
i
i
0@1  gi
w
+ a
G
w
i
+ i
X
j 6=i

1  gj
w
+ a
G
w
i1A = wii(1; )
- if i = 0 then
i(w; g) = w
1+(n 1)i

1  gi
w
+ a
G
w
Y
j 6=i

1  gj
w
+ a
G
w
i
= w1+(n 1)ii(1; )
Next, statement (8) implies that, for a given positive w, i maximizes i(1; ) if and only if wi
maximizes i(w; g); for i = 1; ::n: Hence,  is an equilibrium vector of individual contributions
when the initial endowment is 1 if and only if, for any given w; the vector of individual contributions
g(w) = w  is an equilibrium when the initial endowment is w: Thus, for any given equilibrium
contributions g(!) at endowment ! there exist equilibrium contributions g(v) at endowment v
22
such that
g(!)
!
=
g(v)
v
:
The last statement implies that the amount of the endowment: (1) has no e¤ect on contributions
as a percentage of the endowment; and (2) has a positive e¤ect on the absolute contributions.
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Notes
0Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (grant number IIS-0630805). Data were
generously provided by James Andreoni, Rachel Croson, Mark Isaac, and Ragan Petrie.
1MPCR (Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984) is dened as the product of the marginal rate of substitution and the
marginal rate of transformation. Agent i has endowment wi and contributes gi to the public good. With production
function ' and utility function is ui; the marginal return can be derived from ui(wi   gi; '(
X
gj)). This implies
MPCR =
 
ui2=u
i
1

'z (Ledyard (1995, 44).
2The "hard-nosed" game theory predictions that Ledyard discusses are ones derived from purely-selsh preferences.
3"Warm-glow" altruism means that people give just for the event of giving.
4For a discrete set of contributions, the upper bound is i(
n 2
n 1 ): (See footnote 11 in appendix A.1 for details.)
5According to the distribution reported by Fehr and Schmidt, 60% of the population has  < 0:5: Therefore in all
groups of size 4 and larger,  < 0:5 is expected to be true for at least two individuals.
6The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the hypothesis that all contributions are zero implies rejection of the hypothesis
with p-value of 0.000.
7 If a 2 ( 1
n
; 2
n 1 ] then
n 1
n 3 (1   a)  1 and therefore the if condition in Proposition 1 is satised since i  1 for
all i. If the feasible set of contributions is discrete (as it is in an experiment) then for the empirical distribution of
i( 0:6 for all i) as reported by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the range of a for which no e¤ect is expected is ( 1n ;
2n+1
5(n 1) ]
since that implies n 1
n 2 (1  a)  0:6.
8 If n  1 + 2
a
then n 1
n 3 (1   a)  1 and therefore the if condition in Proposition 1 is satised since i  1 for
all i. If the feasible set of contributions is discrete (as it is in an experiment) then for the empirical distribution of
i( 0:6 for all i) as reported by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), no e¤ect is expected for n  2 + 1 aa 0:4 if a > 0:4 since
that implies n 1
n 2 (1  a)  0:6: If a  0:4 then there is no e¤ect expected for any n  2 since the left-hand-side of the
last inequality is always true.
9ui(y) for i 6= 0 converges pointwise as i ! 0 to the Cobb-Douglas utility function yi
Q
j 6=i
yij : The proof is
similar to that for n = 2 in Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (in press).
10Fehr and Schmidt (1999) report that they can rationalize data from the public good experiment by Fehr and
Gächter (2000) that includes a second stage with an opportunity for punishing free riders that is costly but reduces
inequality. But data from a later experiment do not support inequality aversion as an explanation of punishing
behavior in two-stage extended public good experiments. In the Bosman, et al. (2004) experiment, each monetary
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unit cost imposed on the punishee costs the punisher one unit. Nevertheless punishment of under-contributors is
observed. Such punishing behavior can be explained by negative reciprocity but it cannot be explained by inequality
aversion.
11 In case of a discrete choice set, and the only feasible contribution smaller than gi and larger than the second
highest is the second highest, nothing changes in the proof as long as there are at least three di¤erent levels of
contributions in g: If not then the condition becomes i < (1  a) (n   1)=(n   2). Referring to the parameter
distribution reported by Fehr and Schmidt, i  0:6 for all i. It can be easily checked that (1  a) n 1n 2 > 0:66 for all
experiments reported in Table 1.
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Study
Group Size
(n)
Marginal Return
(a)
Positive contributorsa
(percent)
Andreoni 1988 5 0:5 44
Andreoni 1995a 5 0:5 55
Andreoni 1995b 5 0:5 57
Croson 1996 4 0:5 35
Croson forthcoming 4 0:5 27
Isaac, Walker and Thomas 1984 4 0:3 25
Isaac, Walker and Williams 1994 4 0:3 31
Keser and van Winden 2000 4 0:5 44
Laury and Petrie 2005 4 0:4 38
Ockenfels and Weiman 1999 5 0:33 11
Table 1.Percentage of positive contributors in the last round
a. Reported gures are constructed from data on free riders in the rst and second rows of Table
2 in Andreoni (1988), the rst row (regular condition) of Table 2 in Andreoni (1995a), the third
row (positive framing) of Table 2 in Andreoni (1995b), Appendix 1 (experiments 1 and 2) in Isaac,
Walker and Thomas (1984), the "Data Archives" of Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994), N=4 on
Mark Isaacs homepage, the rst and second rows of Table 2 ("end-game" column) in Keser and van
Winden (2000), author communications for Croson (1996, forthcoming), author communications
for Laury and Petrie (2005), and from Table II in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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Figure 1: Indi¤erence curves for the inequity aversion model
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Figure 2: Distribution of positive contributions
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Figure 3: Indi¤erence curves for the egocentric other-regarding preferences
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Figure 4: Cumulative distributions of individual contributions when endowments are
50 or 60
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